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POLITICS AND PRINCIPLE: AN 
ALTERNATIVE TAKE ON SETH P. WAXMAN'S 
DEFENDING CONGRESS 
NEAL DEVINS' 
Two years ago, the North Carolina Law Review published 
Defending Congress, an important essay by Clinton administration 
Solicitor General Seth Waxman.1 In explaining why the Clinton 
administration defended most but not all federal statutes, Solicitor 
General Waxman argued that principle, not politics or ideology, 
drove his decisionmaking. In the pages that follow, I will take issue 
with Waxman's characterization of Clinton-era decisionmaking-
especially the administration's decision to defend the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996 ("CDA")2 but not 1968 
legislation overriding Miranda v. Arizona.3 In so doing, I will call 
attention to how Waxman's neutral-sounding standard-that the 
Solicitor General should defend laws whenever it is possible to 
advance a "professionally respectable" argument that does not 
require overruling constitutional precedent4-is susceptible to 
* Goodrich Professor of Law, William & Mary Marshall-Wythe School of Law; 
Professor of Government, The College of William & Mary. A.B., 1978, Georgetown 
University; J.D., 1982, Vanderbilt University Law School. The title of this Essay borrows 
from John 0. McGinnis, Principle Versus Politics: The Solicitor General's Office in 
Constitutional and Bureaucratic Theory, 44 STAN. L. REV. 799 (1992). Thanks to Morgan 
Frankel, John McGinnis, Tom Merrill, and Charles Tiefer for comments on an earlier 
draft of this Essay. Thanks also to Harry Tashijan for help in collecting sources. Thanks, 
finally, to Heyward Armstrong and his colleagues at the North Carolina Law Review for 
encouraging me to write this Essay. 
1. Seth P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1073 (2001). 
2. Pub. L. No. 104-104,110 Stat. 133 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) , (d)-
(h) (2000)) (criminally prohibiting use of the Internet to make "indecent" or "patently 
offensive" material available to minors). The Supreme Court invalidated the statute in 
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,849 (1997). 
3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 
Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 701(a), 82 Stat. 197,210-11 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3501 
(2000)) (substituting a "totality of the circumstances" test for so-called Miranda warnings). 
The Supreme Court struck down this law in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 
(2000). For additional discussion, see infra notes 19-25 and accompanying text. 
4. Waxman, supra note 1, at 1078, 1085. Waxman, however, would not have this 
principle apply in separation of powers cases where Congress and the President "find 
themselves at odds regarding the proper interpretation of their own, and each other's, 
constitutional powers." /d. at 1084. This exception (which I will not assess in this Essay) 
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political or ideological manipulation. Correspondingly, I will explain 
why Waxman had little incentive to defend Clinton-era 
decisionmaking as an appropriate exercise of his and/or the 
President's power to independently interpret the Constitution. In 
particular, such an explanation would neither preserve the Solicitor 
General's status as a quasi-independent actor nor allow Waxman to 
simultaneously explain both the soundness of his decisionmaking and 
the wrongness of a successor Solicitor General (make that Ted Olson) 
refusing to defend federal statutes that implicate Congress's power to 
regulate interstate commerce, campaign finance, affirmative action, 
and the like.5 At the same time, I do not mean to suggest that 
Defending Congress is a post hoc rationalization of politicized 
decisionmaking. My aim, instead, is to call attention to how both 
politics and personal belief stand in the way of any Solicitor General 
implementing a predictable, neutral-sounding theory of when he will 
and will not defend acts of Congress. 
Before turning to the particulars of Waxman's essay, I think it 
useful to articulate my understanding of the President's power to 
interpret the Constitution. First and foremost, our tripartite system 
of government assumes that the executive is independent from, not 
subordinate to, Congress and the courts. To maintain that 
independence, a President must be able to decide for himself what the 
Constitution means. By taking an oath to "faithfully execute" his 
office and to "preserve, protect, and defend" the Constitution,6 a 
President affirms that he will not act in violation of the 
Constitution-even if that means refusing to defend the 
constitutionality of legislation. For that very reason, the Clinton 
administration was under no duty to enforce or defend Miranda 
override legislation.7 
adheres to longstanding Justice Department practice. See generally Presidential Authority 
to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. Office of Legal Couns. 199 (1994) 
(discussing the President's constitutional authority to decline to execute unconstitutional 
statutes). 
5. See infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text (discussing Waxman's call for the 
Bush administration to defend Congress's Commerce Clause power). 
6. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 1. 
7. For a more detailed presentation of this argument, see Neal Devins, Asking the 
Right Questions: How the Courts Honored the Separation of Powers by Reconsidering 
Miranda, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 251, 270-74 (2000). For scholarship addressing the 
President's power to interpret the Constitution, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential 
Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905 (1990); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most 
Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994). 
For a competing perspective, see Charles Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Independent 
Officers as Checks on Executive Abuse, 63 B.U. L. REV. 59, 90 (1983) (arguing that 
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In saying that a President need not defend or execute a law he 
thinks unconstitutional, I am not suggesting that the President is not 
bound by the rule of law. Like Waxman, I think that the Solicitor 
General has a "responsibility to account for the interests of all three 
branches of government."8 For example, a President cannot place 
himself above the Court by refusing to execute a judicial order, even 
if he thinks the order is constitutionally infirm. Moreover, to allow 
each branch to check the others, presidents-whenever possible-
should enforce constitutionally suspect legislation in order to set the 
stage for a court challenge.9 
The question remains: Should Solicitor General filings before 
the Supreme Court reflect the President's understanding of the 
Constitution? In answering this question, Waxman contends that the 
Solicitor General must maintain fidelity, not to the President, but to 
the "rule of law" and, with it, the Supreme Court's "history of judicial 
review." 10 Contending that "the Supreme Court has the final word on 
the meaning of the Constitution," Waxman argues that the best way 
to "honor the important doctrine of stare decisis" is to fence out cases 
in which the Court would have to overrule one of its precedents from 
the Solicitor General's normal practice of "[v]igorously defending 
congressional legislation. "11 
In explaining the workings of this model, Waxman draws a 
distinction between his defense of the CDA and his refusal to defend 
Miranda override legislation. The CDA case, as Waxman recognizes, 
was a sure loser. 12 Congress, "without hearings or committee 
"faithful execution" does not include the President's power to refuse to implement 
statutes he thinks unconstitutional). 
8. Waxman, supra note 1, at 1078. 
9. Unlike Waxman, I think that the Article III case or controversy requirement may 
foreclose the executive from making arguments identical to the arguments made by the 
party challenging executive branch enforcement. See Devins, supra note 7, at 277-79. As 
such, presidents may not be able to enforce a law while arguing that it is unconstitutional. 
For a general treatment of this issue, see Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement 
of Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2000, 
at 7. 
10. Waxman, supra note 1, at 1088, 1078. 
11. /d. at 1085-86, 1078. Waxman also argues that, by defending the constitutionality 
of federal laws, the Solicitor General gives "proper respect ... to Congress's policy 
choices." /d. at 1078. Yet, by refusing to defend in some cases (even when "professionally 
responsible" arguments can be made), it is clear that Waxman's principal allegiance is to 
the Supreme Court (or at least Supreme Court precedent). For additional discussion, see 
infra notes 16-21 and accompanying text. 
12. In addition to comments made in Defending Congress, Waxman had earlier 
described the CDA as too much of "a blunt instrument" and Reno v. ACLU as "an easy 
case." Nadine Strossen, Foreword, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. i, viii-ix & n.23 (1998) 
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consideration," imposed criminal penalties on "indecent" or "patently 
offensive" speech available to children on the Internet. 13 All six 
lower court judges that had ruled on the CDA found the law facially 
unconstitutional "in every respect."14 Consequently, while the CDA 
is "an example some people chuckle to recall," Waxman sees it as an 
exemplar of the Solicitor General's serving "our adversarial system of 
constitutional adjudication" by articulating the "strongest possible 
rationale in support of [the] constitutionality" of legislationY In 
explaining his decision not to defend Miranda override legislation, 
Waxman invokes another ideal: namely, his "obligation to honor" 
stare decisis. 16 Contending that "the statute in question could not be 
reconciled with Miranda, it could constitutionally be applied only if 
the Court were to overrule Miranda," Waxman saw his refusal to 
defend this statute as a way of maintaining "fidelity to the rule of 
law. "17 
Upon closer examination, however, there is reason to question 
this narrative. To start, Waxman overstates matters when arguing 
that the only way he could have defended Miranda override 
legislation was to ask the Justices to explicitly overrule their 
"landmark" "constitutional" decision in Miranda. 18 When upholding 
Miranda override statute, for example, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that Miranda created 
nonconstitutional, prophylactic rules, and, consequently, Congress 
could override the decision without compelling the Court to overturn 
a constitutional ruling. 19 Likewise, the attorney defending the statute 
before the Court as well as the House General Counsel and a 
coalition of Senators who filed amicus briefs in the case all argued 
that the Miranda rules were not mandated by the Constitution.20 In 
(discussing why "as President of the ACLU" she was "perturbed about the squandering of 
our government's resources" in the defense of a law that the Justice Department thought 
"'obviously unconstitutional' ")(internal quotation omitted). 
13. Waxman, supra note 1, at 1079 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 223(d)(1)(B) (2000)) (internal 
quotation omitted). 
14. /d. (citing Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 521 U.S. 
1113 (1997), and ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824,849 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 521 U.S. 844 
(1997)). 
15. /d. 
16. !d. at 1085. 
17. /d.at1088. 
18. !d. at1087-88. 
19. United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 684-92 (4th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 530 U.S. 
428 (2000). 
20. See Brief of Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae Urging Affirmance of the Judgment 
Below at 5, Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (No. 99-5525); Brief Amicus 
Curiae of the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the United States House of 
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short, it appears as if a "professionally responsible" argument 
defending the statute could have been made without calling upon the 
Court to "overturn" one of its precedents.21 That argument would 
have contended that prophylactic rules are not constitutional in 
stature and, consequently, Congress is free to modify them, as it is 
free to modify rules of federal common law. 
That, of course, does not mean that that argument is either the 
correct reading of Miranda or the Constitution.22 It does suggest, 
however, that the decision not to defend the statute is best explained 
by Waxman's views of the Constitution's right against self-
incrimination and/or Miranda. Indeed, in his certiorari petition 
before the Court, Waxman argued that Miranda "promotes public 
confidence that the criminal justice system is fair" and that "[s]teps 
that may damage that confidence should not be taken lightly."23 
Along these lines, there is reason to speculate that Waxman thought 
the costs of the Solicitor General's backing Congress were too high. 
In particular, when the Supreme Court agreed to hear the Miranda 
override case, the New York Times and Legal Times spoke of 
Miranda as "not without ambiguity" and predicted that "the decision 
is likely to be close."24 Consequently, rather than find himself an 
important player in the undoing of Miranda, Waxman may have 
Representatives in Support of Affirmance at 15, Dickerson (No. 99-5525); Brief Amicus 
Curiae of Senators Orrin G. Hatch et al. Urging Affirmation at 6, Dickerson (No. 99-
5525). On the other side (arguing that the statute could be sustained only if Miranda was 
overruled), a brief written by Charles Tiefer and filed by the House Democratic 
Leadership advanced arguments similar to those advanced in Waxman's brief for the 
United States. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the House Democratic Leadership in Support 
of Petitioner at 22, Dickerson (No. 99-5525). For additional discussion, see infra notes 21-
25 and accompanying text. 
21. Indeed, Waxman's decision not to defend appears at odds with his claim that the 
Solicitor General, in order to defend a constitutionally suspect act of Congress, often 
"lean[s] heavily on the Ashwander principle of construing a statute so as to avoid 
constitutional doubt." Waxman, supra note 1, at 1079-80 (citing Ashwander v. TV A, 297 
u.s. 288,348 (1936)). 
22. Along these lines, it is possible that Waxman would have defended a statute that 
embraced a different view of the Miranda decision. For example, it is possible that 
Waxman would have defended a statute specifying that the remedy for a violation of 
Miranda should be money damages (not the exclusion of evidence). That type of statute 
would not have questioned whether the Court's comments about the inherently coercive 
nature of custodial interrogations were, ultimately, a proposition of constitutional law. 
Thanks to Tom Merrill for pointing this out to me. 
23. Brief for the United States at 36, Dickerson (No. 99-5525). 
24. Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Hear Case that Tests Miranda Decision, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 7,1999, at Al; Tony Mauro, Justices Debate Miranda, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 24, 
2000, at 9. 
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thought it best to try to undo Congress's handiwork by advancing his 
views about Miranda.25 
Waxman's defense of the CDA can also be recast.26 Rather than 
exemplifying the Solicitor General's willingness to defend 
constitutionally suspect legislation, the CDA defense may be tied to 
United States v. Knox,27 a political debacle involving first term Clinton 
Solicitor General Drew Days. Knox raised the issue of whether a 
1984 child pornography law applied to photographs of young girls 
dressed in scanty appareJ.28 The (first) Bush administration had 
successfully argued that the law did apply to such photos. But after 
the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, Solicitor General 
Days "confessed error" and, in so doing, joined forces with the 
American Civil Liberties Union in arguing that the Bush 
interpretation was incorrect. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court 
remanded Knox to the Third Circuit and, as Solicitor General Days 
put it, "all hell broke loose."29 All one hundred senators voted for a 
resolution condemning the Solicitor General's brief, and a 1994 crime 
bill included a section expressing Congress's sense that the 1984 law, 
in fact, did apply to children wearing scanty appareP° For his part, 
the President released a letter to Attorney General Reno agreeing 
with "the Senate about what the proper scope of the child 
pornography law should be."31 And finally, when the Knox case 
returned to the Supreme Court, the Clinton Department of Justice (in 
a brief signed by Attorney General Reno) shifted its position and 
argued in favor of a broad interpretation of the 1984law.32 
25. President Clinton backed Waxman's decision not to defend the Miranda override 
statute. See Tony Mauro, Seth Waxman's Supreme Confidence, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 23, 
2000, at 12, 14 (describing the White House meeting between President Clinton, Attorney 
General Reno, and Solicitor General Waxman). 
26. Technically, the decision to defend the CDA was made by then-Acting Solicitor 
General Walter Dellinger. Waxman, however, did argue the case before the Court and 
refers to that argument in Defending Congress. See Waxman, supra note 1, at 1079. 
27. 776 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Pa. 1991), affd, 977 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1992), dismissed, 
vacated, and remanded, 510 U.S. 939 (1993). 
28. Knox, 766 F. Supp. at 179-80. 
29. DrewS. Days, III, When the President Says "No ": A Few Thoughts on Executive 
Power and the Tradition of Solicitor Genera/Independence, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 
509,515 (2001) (internal quotation omitted). 
30. See 139 CONG. REC. 29,568-70 (1993) (statements of Sen. Roth and Sen. 
Grassley); Linda Greenhouse, Court Rejects Appeal of Man Convicted in Child Smut Case 
With Political Overtones, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1995, at D20. 
31. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Demagoging Kidporn: Justice Gets Bad Rap, LEGAL TIMES, 
Nov. 29, 1993, at 26 (quoting the Clinton letter). 
32. See Pierre Thomas, Reno Takes Tougher Stance on Child Pornography, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 11 , 1994, at A3. 
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Against this backdro11, it is Fttle wonder that Waxman might 
have had no taste for a starring role in "Son of Knox." Moreover, 
unlike Miranda override legislation, there was little prospect of a 
Solicitor General brief and oral argument supporting the CDA 
materially affecting the outcome of the litigation. I do not mean to 
suggest here that the only reason Waxman defended the CDA was 
because he feared political backlash.33 At the same time, the standard 
he articulates is easily manipulable. For another Solicitor General, 
Miranda override legislation could have been defended without 
calling for the outright reversal of Miranda. Likewise, the CDA was 
seen as a sure loser because the Court would have had to overrule or 
reinterpret past precedent to uphold the statute. And if that is the 
case, another Solicitor General could have concluded that the CDA 
could not be defended without asking the Court to overrule a 
constitutional precedent.34 
Indeed, Waxman concedes that it is sometimes permissible for 
the Solicitor General to ask the Court to overrule past precedent. 
But he never explains when that is appropriate. For example, if the 
Truman administration was right in calling for the overruling of 
Plessy v. Ferguson,35 was the Reagan administration also correct in 
calling for the overruling of Roe v. Wade?36 And if not, why not?37 
33. The Clinton Department of Justice may have hoped the Court would recalibrate 
its doctrine and uphold the CDA. Under this scenario, of course, Waxman would have 
strong incentive to launch a vigorous defense of the CD A. 
34. Along these very lines, Waxman explained his predecessor's decision not to 
defend federal legislation that gave special treatment to nursing services " 'operated, or 
listed and certified, by the First Church of Christ, Scientist, Boston, Massachusetts.' " 
Waxman, supra note 1, at 1080 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(e) (1994)). In particular, even 
though the Civil Division had "fought valiantly in the district court" by trying to defend 
the statute as consistent with existing precedent, the Solicitor General thought that he 
"could not continue to advocate the statute's constitutionality" without asking the Court 
to overturn Establishment Clause precedents. /d. at 1081. 
35. 163 u.s. 537 (1896). . 
36. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For a general treatment of the Reagan administration's call 
for the Supreme Court to overturn Roe, see CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW 71-88 
(1991 ). 
37. Waxman never makes clear whether his embrace of stare decisis applies only to 
constitutional challenges to federal legislation or, alternatively, whether he thinks that the 
Solicitor General should not call for the overruling of earlier precedents. His essay, of 
course, is about the rules governing the defense of federal statutes. At the same time, his 
comments about stare decisis seem more generalizable. For example, Waxman refers to 
the Truman administration's call for the overruling of Plessy (in a case that did not 
implicate a federal statute) to be the exception that "prove[s] the general rule" that the 
Solicitor General must exercise "extreme restraint" before calling for the overruling of 
constitutional precedent. Waxman, supra note 1, at 1087. Waxman, however, never 
squares this suggestion with his apparent embrace of a conflicting proposition-that is, 
HeinOnline -- 81 N.C. L. Rev. 2068 2002-2003
2068 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
Moreover, what does it mean_ to say that the Solicitor General can 
only make "professionally responsible" arguments? Waxman never 
explains how he would draw the line separating a responsible 
argument from an irresponsible one. 
From my vantage point, Defending Congress is better used to 
explain past decisionmaking than it is to predict future 
decisionmaking. This does not mean that Solicitor General Waxman 
placed his personal beliefs ahead of his stated commitment to the 
"rule of law"; instead, Waxman may have thought he was fairly 
applying the principles enunciated in Defending Congress.38 
Nevertheless, I cannot help but notice how Waxman's essay is a 
template both for maintaining the power and prestige of the Solicitor 
General and for limiting the ability of future Solicitors General to 
advance the social conservative agenda by calling either for the 
overruling of disfavored precedents or the Court's invalidation of 
disfavored federal statutes. 
Let me explain. First, the 2000 elections were lurking in the 
background of Defending Congress, which was drawn from a 
September 15, 2000, address. At that time, Waxman was well aware 
of differences between "[s]trong conservatives" and "moderates and 
liberals" on, for example, "the federal-state balance."39 By 
contending that "the Solicitor General must be the steward and 
champion of Congress's legislative judgments,"40 Waxman suggests 
that it would be professionally irresponsible for the current 
administration to refuse to defend federal statutes by invoking states' 
rights values.41 Moreover, by tying his proposal to the sanctity of the 
"rule of law" and, with it, stare decisis, Waxman did more than 
that the President has the power to independently interpret the Constitution. See id. at 
1078-79 n.14. 
38. Consider, for example, Waxman's October 13, 1999, refusal to defend an 
abrogation provision in federal copyright law. See Letter from Janet Reno, Attorney 
General, to Albert Gore, Jr., President of the Senate (Oct. 13, 1999) (on file with the 
North Carolina Law Review). Here, Waxman's decision can only be understood as a good 
faith effort to put into effect a 1999 Supreme Court ruling invalidating an analogous 
federal patent statute. In other words, in calling attention to how politics or ideology 
might play a role in the implementation of the model advanced by Solicitor General 
Waxman, I am not arguing that Waxman's decisionmaking, in fact, was animated by 
politics or ideology. See supra p. 2062, infra p. 2072-73 (repeating this assertion). 
39. Seth P. Waxman, Foreword: Does the Solicitor General Matter?, 53 STAN. L. REV. 
1115, 1126 (2001) (adapted from remarks delivered on February 4, 2001 ). 
40. /d. 
41. Indeed, Waxman closed his February 4, 2001, address on whether "the Solicitor 
General matters" by remarking: "Let us watch very carefully how my successor answers 
those questions" on whether he will do his duty and place the national interest ahead of 
(what may well be) his personal beliefs. /d. 
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provide a rationale for his decision not to defend Miranda override 
legislation. He also sent a message that it would be wrong for the 
Bush administration to call for the overturning of Supreme Court 
decisions on abortion, school prayer, affirmative action, and the like.42 
Second (and far more important), Defending Congress's claims 
about the Solicitor General's "obligation to honor the important 
doctrine of stare decisis"43 are not simply a benchmark that 
bootstraps the current administration; these claims also speak to the 
Solicitor General's quasi-independent status and, correspondingly, 
the wrongness of either Congress or the President seeking to 
influence Solicitor General decisionmaking. Likewise, without 
explicitly mentioning the controversy surrounding Reagan and (first) 
Bush-era Solicitors General conforming to administration policy and 
calling for the overruling of Roe, Waxman seems well aware of the 
benefits of insulating the Solicitor General from the burly-burly of 
politics.44 
Political insulation, however, cannot be achieved with a stump 
speech describing the Solicitor General as a "serv[ant]" to "his 
country" whose responsibility is "to account for the interests of all 
three branches of government."45 More to the point, Congress is 
likely to leave the Solicitor General alone so long as the Solicitor 
General is sensitive to Congress's needs.46 By defending nearly all 
federal statutes, Solicitors General are able to both earn Congress's 
trust and protect their turf.47 
42. For additional discussion, see John 0. McGinnis, Principle Versus Politics: The 
Solicitor General's Office in Constitutional and Bureaucratic Theory, 44 STAN. L. REV. 
799,811-12 (1992) (contending that lawyers who work in the Solicitor General's office are 
apt to embrace Warren Court liberalism). 
43. Waxman, supra note 1, at 1085-86. 
44. For an argument that the Solicitor General should represent the President's 
interests, see McGinnis, supra note 42. For an argument (quite similar to Waxman's) that 
the Solicitor General's duty is to the rule of law, see LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH 
JUSTICE (1987). 
45. Waxman, supra note 1, at 1088,1078. 
46. Perhaps because counsel for the House and Senate stand ready to defend-on 
separation of powers grounds-the constitutionality of federal statutes, Congress is 
accepting of the Justice Department's refusal to defend statutes on separation of powers 
grounds. See Charles Tiefer, The Senate and House Counsel Offices: Dilemmas of 
Representing in Court the Institutional Congressional Client, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Spring 1998, at 47, 50-55. In making this point, I am not suggesting that federal courts 
ought to ignore Article III justiciability constraints in order to allow the President and 
Congress to advance conflicting constitutional interpretations. See Devins, supra note 7, 
at 277-79 (arguing that INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), was nonjusticiable for 
precisely this reason). 
47. Solicitors General, moreover, must signal their willingness to defend federal 
statutes in order to secure Senate confirmation. This was true for Waxman and, more 
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In addition to th,ese. So~icitor pel1eraJ-specific concerns, the 
President and the Attorney General too have strong incentives to 
work with Congress.48 Congress can pressure the executive through 
any one of a number of techniques, including the power to confirm 
nominees; cut off funds to the. Ju~tice Department and other 
executive agencies; subject Justice Department officials to oversight 
hearings and other types of jawboning; and finally, shift litigation 
authority away from the Justice Department (and the concomitant 
power to shift government operations away from the executive and to 
independent agencies). Against this backdrop, it is little wonder that 
the President and Attorney General almost always want the Justice 
Department to defend the constitutionality of legislation. In 
particular, by accommodating Congress in this way, the President and 
Attorney General get something in return: peace-that is, lawmaker 
acquiescence to Justice Department control of litigation, especially 
Supreme Court litigation.49 
Consider, for example, the Clinton administration's flip-flop in 
the Knox litigation. Recognizing the costs of advancing a narrow 
definition of child pornography laws, the President and Attorney 
General disavowed Solicitor General Days's arguments and, in so 
doing, placated Congress.50 Likewise, in Metro Broadcasting v. FCC,51 
the (first) Bush administration took Congress's support of race 
preferences into account. Specifically, in an effort both to get the 
Senate to confirm his three picks for the Federal Communications 
Commission ("FCC") and to otherwise establish a good working 
relationship between the Commission and its congressional overseers, 
the President nominated Commissioners who supported diversity 
recently, for Solicitor General Ted Olson. For example, in discussing campaign finance 
reform legislation, then-nominee Ted Olson remarked that "the fact that the President 
might have expressed some doubts doesn't alleviate the Justice Department from its 
responsibility to do everything it can within reason to defend the constitutionality of the 
statute." Confirmation Hearing on the Nominations of Larry D. Thompson to be Deputy 
Attorney General and Theodore B. Olson to be Solicitor General of the United States, 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 127 (2001) (statement of Ted 
Olson) (Sup. Doc. No. Y4.J89/2:S.HRG.107-250). 
48. A more detailed presentation of the argument laid out in this paragraph can be 
found in Neal Devins, Defending Congress's Interests in Court: How Lawmakers and the 
President Bargain Over Department of Justice Representation, 32 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 
157, 160-65 (2002). 
49. For an explanation of why the President supports the centralization of litigation 
authority in the Justice Department, see Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Battle That 
Never Was: Congress, the White House, and Agency Litigation Authority, LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1998, at 205, 219-20. 
50. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text. 
51. 497 u.s. 547 (1990). 
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preferences. 52 Correspondingly, J ev~n though: the· administration 
thought these preferences were unconstitutional, the Solicitor 
General let the FCC defend their constitutionality before the 
Supreme Court (allowing the administration to attack the preference 
program as an amicus without risking the case's dismissal on 
mootness grounds).53 In these and other ways, the President, 
Attorney General, and Solicitor General seek to maintain goodwill 
with Congress by accommodating lawmaker preferences. 
What, then, of Solicitor General Waxman's decision not to 
defend Miranda override legislation? Here, the Solicitor General was 
well aware of Congress's interest in the statute. Oversight hearings 
had been held in 1995 and 1997; at that time, Solicitor General Days 
and Attorney General Reno were both asked about the Justice 
Department's willingness to utilize Miranda override legislation.54 At 
the same time, the Clinton administration almost certainly knew that 
Democrats in Congress did not support the 1968 Miranda override 
legislation. House Democratic leadership, for example, filed a brief 
extolling Miranda's "extraordinary history of acceptance and success 
in federal law enforcement" and otherwise calling for the 
reaffirmation of Miranda.55 In other words, unlike the Knox litigation 
(where Congress spoke as one), Miranda override litigation required 
the Clinton administration to choose sides in a contested battle. It 
therefore is hardly surprising that the President, Attorney General, 
and Solicitor General would decide not to defend the 
constitutionality of Miranda override legislation.56 
52. See Neal Devins, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Requiem for a Heavyweight, 
69 TEX. L. REV. 125, 152-53 & n.181 (1990). 
53. For a more detailed discussion of the politics behind the Metro Broadcasting 
litigation, see Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Control of 
Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 255 (1994). 
54. See Oversight of the Department of Justice: Hearing Before the Comm. on the 
Judiciary on Oversight on the Operations of the Department of Justice, 105th Cong. 71-72 
(2000) (questioning of Attorney General Reno by Senator Jeff Sessions (R-AJa.) on the 
Miranda override legislation) (Sup. Doc. No. Y4.J89/2:S.HRG105-1041); Solicitor General 
Oversight: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary on Examining the Operation and 
Activities of the Office of the Solicitor General of the Department of Justice, 104th Cong. 
29-33 (1997) (Sup. Doc. No. Y4.J89/2:SHRG.104-818) (questioning of Solicitor General 
Days by Senator Fred Thompson (R-Tenn.) on the government's position regarding 
Congress's ability to make laws which override Miranda). 
55. Brief Amicus Curiae of the House Democratic Leadership at 5, Dickerson v. 
United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (No. 99-5525). While this brief was filed after the 
Clinton administration's decision, it seems likely that the administration knew that 
Democrats in Congress would support their decision. 
56. See Mauro, supra note 24. 
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Likewise, it is not surprising that •Waxman would pitch his 
decision not to defend Miranda override legislation as grounded in 
the Solicitor General's "obligation to honor" stare decisis and, with it, 
the rule of law.57 From the standpoint of Solicitor General-Congress 
relations, this type of defense (which may well reflect Waxman's 
reading of Miranda) is less vulnerable to political attack than a 
defense grounded in the Solicitor General's understanding of 
presidential desires, good public policy, or even the Constitution's 
meaning. In particular, a defense grounded in stare decisis looks to 
what the Court thinks, not what the Solicitor General and/or 
President thinks. Correspondingly, such a defense communicates to 
Congress that the Solicitor General can still be looked to as a 
vigorous advocate of legislation, for he will not place his or the 
President's views ahead of Congress's.58 
From the standpoint of Solicitor General-White House relations, 
Waxman also had good reason to speak about his obligations to 
Congress and the Court. The Solicitor General's reputation for 
professionalism and independence is tied to the notion that his 
allegiances run outside of the executive branch to the Supreme Court 
and, more generally, to the rule of law. More to the point: The 
power of the Solicitor General is tied to his reputation for 
independence. Accordingly, the Solicitor General has little incentive 
to refuse to defend an act of Congress, especially when such a 
decision places his office on the sidelines and opens him up to charges 
of acting politically. Instead, by seeing himself both as an officer of 
the Court and an advocate for all parts of the government, the 
Solicitor General maximizes influence with both the Supreme Court 
and other parts of the government. 
I do not mean to suggest that Waxman does not see the Solicitor 
General as a quasi-independent advocate; my suspicion is that 
Waxman truly believes what he says. I also suspect that Waxman 
finds his theory irresistible, in part, because it protects the 
independence of his office, provides a neutral-sounding justification 
for his decisionmaking in the Miranda override litigation, and can be 
57. Waxman, supra note 1, at 1085, 1088. 
58. Along these lines, Supreme Court Justices will interpret a decision to defend an 
act of Congress as a procedural decision grounded in respect for Congress's policymaking 
powers and the Court's authority to rule on the constitutionality of federal legislation. In 
contrast, Justices-assuming they buy Waxman's theory-will interpret a decision not to 
defend an act of Congress as a substantive evaluation that the Solicitor General could not 
utilize existing Supreme Court precedent to advance a "professionally responsible" 
argument. 
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used to attack social conservatives who want the Solicitor General to 
advance their agenda before the Supreme Court.59 That this theory is 
also subject to political and ideological manipulation speaks to a 
larger point about whether the Solicitor · General, in fact, can be 
bound by a predictable, neutral-sounding theory. 
Whether or not he sees himself as a political actor, the Solicitor 
General must operate in a political world. By necessity, he must 
juggle numerous balls and otherwise engage in a complex balancing 
act. On high profile cases, the Solicitor General cannot help but 
notice Congress, the White House, agency heads, the Attorney 
General and division heads within the Department of Justice, 
careerist lawyers in his office, the press, legal academics, and other 
elites. More than that, the Solicitor General knows that his 
effectiveness may well be measured by his won-lost record before the 
Supreme Court-as well as his ability to insulate his office from direct 
political influence. Waxman is no doubt well aware of the difficulties 
of balancing competing interests and successfully advancing an 
agenda before the Supreme Court. In other writings, he effectively 
discusses how "context and advocacy" can and should affect Solicitor 
General decisionmaking.60 Against this backdrop, there is little to 
commend a predictable monolithic theory. 
Solicitor General Waxman, no doubt, understands this; 
Defending Congress advances a theory that at once sounds highly 
principled but nevertheless can be manipulated to accommodate 
political reality and personal belief. Indeed, although there is no 
59. This suspicion is grounded in my belief that people of integrity often employ 
"motivated reasoning"-the notion that individuals will embrace reasoning "strategies" 
consistent with their "desire[s] or preferences." Christopher H. Schroeder, Causes of the 
Recent Turn in Constitutional Interpretation, 51 DUKE L.J. 307, 351-59 (2001) (quoting 
Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 480 (1990)). 
60. Waxman, supra note 39, at 1126 (discussing ongoing federalism litigation and 
noting that "we are at a delicate point in the Commerce Clause journey" which may be 
very much affected by the Solicitor General's actions). Also, in a wonderful essay on 
Supreme Court advocacy, Waxman demonstrates his awareness of how politics and 
context impacted the Solicitor General's defense of New Deal legislation. See Seth P. 
Waxman, The Physics of Persuasion: Arguing the New Deal, 88 GEO. L.J. 2399, 2399 
(2000). For this very reason, Waxman argues that the Roosevelt administration should 
have focused its energies on the pursuit of winnable cases-even if that meant that the 
administration would not defend some of its regulatory schemes and (for some period of 
time) related congressional legislation. See id. at 2405-07 (discussing the wrongness of 
appealing United States v. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 76 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1935), 
rev'd, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)). For a general treatment of how the Solicitor General uses his 
power to select cases to shape Supreme Court doctrine, see Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. 
Spitzer, The Government Litigant Advantage: Implications for the Law, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 391 (2000). 
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reason to think that Waxman does not sincerely believe everything he 
says in Defending Congress, it is nevertheless striking that his 
argument simultaneously justifies his decisionmaking, protects the 
Office of Solicitor General from political attack, and furthers his 
desire to constrain Solicitor General Olson from advancing 
arguments he dislikes.61 For all these reasons, Waxman's argument 
should be greeted with awe as well as skepticism. And while this 
Essay has invested most of its energy in suggesting that there is 
reason to be skeptical when reading Defending Congress, Waxman 
deserves credit for writing a plausible and entertaining essay explicitly 
defending his tenure as Solicitor General and implicitly limiting the 
Bush administration in its efforts to use the Solicitor General's office 
to advance the social conservative agenda.62 
61. On this last point, see Waxman, supra note 39, at 1126 (noting that with regard to 
federalism, the Solicitor General acts as "the steward and champion of Congress's 
legislative judgments and [in] the long-term institutional interests of the national 
government"). 
62. More than two years after his confirmation as Solicitor General, Ted Olson has 
neither called for the overruling of any Supreme Court precedents nor declined to defend 
the constitutionality of any federal statute. This, of course, is not to say that Olson has not 
pursued any socially conservative causes. In May 2002, Olson informed the Supreme 
Court of his belief that the Second Amendment protects an individual's right to bear arms 
and therefore extends beyond militias. See Tony Mauro, Warning Shots Foretold Gun 
Flip: Observers of SG Saw Internal Struggle, LEGAL TIMES, May 13, 2002, at 8. More 
generally, in the wake of September 11, 2001, Solicitor General Olson has invested 
considerable energy in defending various Bush administration initiatives tied to the 
ongoing "War on Terror." See Neil A. Lewis, Loss Shadows Solicitor General's Victories, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2002, at 18. 
